General McClellan: Caution in Context | Civil War Profiles | Union Army of the Potomac | US history

McClellan's politics had to have played into his caution. He was way too friendly with copperheads and Democrats in general to be the kind of ruthless leader willing to do anything necessary to win. Grant and Sherman showed there was no way to win this war nicely.

Saying McClellan didn't like Lincoln is an understatement. Ole George highly disrespected Abe when he visited Mac at his house in Washington Abe was sitting in Mac's living room and when he came home went up stairs to bed.
Not very gentlemanly like and a real bad move.
Enjoy YAH ELOHIM !

Excellent topic. At 34 years old, McClellan might have been too immature to maintain the necessary personal relationships with Lincoln and Stanton. He was certainly arrogant and condescending and full of himself when interacting with superiors, though almost godlike in inspiring his subordinates. McClellan had also been a friend and protégé of Jefferson Davis in the 1850s when Davis was Secretary of War in Franklin Pierce's administration. Davis had sent McClellan to Europe to study their military operations, including seeing the Crimean War from both sides. Thus, McClellan perhaps could not bring himself to unleash an all-out battle of slaughter against his former Southern friends.

With leaders like these, who needs enemies??

I am a McClellan apologist. You touch on some points that begin to show what happened with him, and that the disdain with which he is treated is grotesquely in error. When asked which Union general troubled him the most, Robert E. Lee said, "It was always McClellan." He had his flaws, as do we all, but he was capable of more than he was allowed to do. His greatest enemy was... Lincoln. Abraham Lincoln was a political genius, but a military novice who never understood the complexities of the strategic and tactical situation. Had he been allowed to proceed as he wished McClellan might have won the war by 1863. Another "what might have been."

Ok, but what goes entirely unmentioned here is that McClellan was also definitely on the paranoid side. If you read some of his correspondence, he thinks he‘s the greatest General ever but Lincoln and Halleck are actually sabotaging him. Totally rational.

So is his conviction that Lee has him outnumbered part of that paranoia? Who knows, but at the end of the day it‘s more than just rational caution. Meade and Thomas were also cautious generals, but they didn‘t go around throwing away obvious wins. Although I will say that Meade is also criticized for not going after Lee post-Gettysburg.

So he‘s paranoid and afraid of decisive action…not the best traits for a general.

Your narrative makes the dubious assumption that McClellan even wanted to defeat the Confederacy. American High School History Texts are sanitized of any references to the Northern Copperheads, the substantial portion of the Northern population that actually opposed the Civil War. Lincoln even suspended habeas corpus so that he could throw war protesters in jail without charges just to stifle dissent. Historian Eric Foner says that the largest insurrection in American History was The Civil War and the second largest were the Draft Riots which essentially protested the War. You also failed to mention that McClellan ran against Lincoln in 1864 on a Democratic platform that promised to END The Civil War. Some historians say that it was only Sherman's infamous March Through Georgia that saved reelection for Lincoln. Liberal commentator Gore Vidal called Abraham Lincoln a "dictator", but I would call him "mentally ill" instead. The Union that Lincoln was so obsessed with preserving existed only in his head.

Lincoln stymied Mac during the 7 days by yanking a division and a corps from him that was to come down from the north and link up with Porter around the Gaines Mill area. Had Porter had those units Mac may have beaten Lee and Jackson at Gaines Mills and not had to change his base and ruin his original plan. Mac was also a Democrat and viewed by the Republicans in congress with suspicion.

Thank you for the interesting take on Gen. G.B. McClellan but I have to say it seems a bit too charitable. You don't mention Special Order 191, which disclosed Lee's entire campaign strategy to McClellan. Yet McClellan could not get his army in motion quickly enough to take advantage of this incredible gift. Imagine if Grant or Sherman had been in McClellan's position! They would have moved immediately to destroy Lee's army and ended the war. At the battle itself McClellan outnumbered Lee two to one. But McClellan's disjointed and incoherent battle plan turned the battle into three separate non-unified segments where his overall numerical superiority became meaningless. Even then he kept 30,000 men in reserve! For what! An imaginary counter-attack? The day after the battle Lee kept his army on the field, knowing with contempt that McClellan would not resume the attack that day; that night Lee withdrew his army from the field and back into Virginia. McClellan then issued an outrageous declaration to the army stating that "we have driven the enemy from our country." No, George! As Lincoln said, "It is ALL our country." In the peninsular campaign he wasted an entire month preparing a siege campaign against essentially a shadow Confederate force while Richmond prepared. It is true that McDowell, Pope, Burnside and Hooker all lost battles to the Army of Northern Virginia. But none of them had the golden opportunity McClellan had to end the war and wasted it due to excessive caution and hesitation.

The point that McClellan does everything he does with the (mis)conception that he is out-numbered is a very good point, it makes one realize he was actually being kinda ballsy. Contrast that with Grant who knew with complete certainty that he was not out-numbered.

McClellan is the personification of all the strengths and weaknesses of West Point.

Wat a tosser

McClelland was a Southern sympathizer from the beginning, as were several other Union generals including Butler, Burnside, and Custer. The picture of McClelland with the 'Lion's Paw' pose is very telling.

I believe another aspect of his caution was his situation with supply. There are multiple accounts, diaries, and reports ( from common soldiers to quartermaster) that shows the troops were woefully under equipped and I believe McClellan would not willingly send his boys into battle in such a state, where they would be unable to act.

Great video! When assessing McClellan's skill as a general, it's very helpful to look at the raw statistics and high-level events and remove the more colorful elements of personalities and anecdotes that are very entertaining, but often distract from hard facts in discussions of generalship in the context of the Civil War.

Comparing McClellan's 1862 campaign to that of Grant in 1864, we see that the total number of troops available to the Union armies in the East, in early 1862, was around 200,000 men Present for Duty (PFD) (counting the Army of the Potomac, forces in the Valley, defenses of Washington and forces at Fort Monroe).

Of these, McClellan was permitted to use no more than about 120,000 PFD (total initial strength of units which went into the army by the Seven Days, or Seven Days army strength plus all previous casualties) in his army operating against Richmond, with the rest being kept back to defend Washington in some sense.

As against this, the Confederates had a number of men available to defend Richmond which by the end of June 1862 (plus all previous casualties) numbered between 125,000 PFD (low estimate, directly from Dr. Joseph Harsh) and 140,000 (high estimate, assuming same per-regiment strength as Union). In terms of regiments formed by aggregating all companies and dividing by ten, McClellan has 175 and Lee has 215.

The total number of troops available to Grant in 1864, counting all the troops which entered his army by the end of June 1864, was much closer to 200,000 PFD; by the same measure of strength Lee had about 100,000 PFD which entered his army by the end of June 1864.

Now, the exact numbers here are certainly up for debate, but the scale of the difference isn't. McClellan was fighting at not more than numerical parity for the campaign as a whole, while Grant was fighting at around a 2:1 overall advantage - and this has a huge impact on the ability of a commander to fight a battle of attrition.

It's also important to point out what Grant actually did in his offensive against Richmond. There were lots of battles, but in terms of where the armies were at the end of Grant's Overland campaign Cold Harbor was fought north of the Chickahominy, and Grant then disengaged and moved to the James not far from Berkeley Plantation. He crossed the James on a pontoon bridge, set up his forces to threaten Petersburg, and stayed there in a threatening posture for the next several months with occasional offensives until reinforcements allowed him to overextend the Confederates the next spring.

McClellan fought a battle north of the Chickahominy, then fought several more battles in the process of disengaging and moving to the James not far from Berkeley Plantation. He asked for pontoons to build a bridge allowing him to cross the James (and was denied), asked for reinforcements (and was promised them by Lincoln, but then Halleck made the decision not to send any), and was preparing to advance against Richmond again when ordered off the Peninsula.

So in terms of time (number of months after offensive commenced), resources (something as simple as pontoons) and manpower, McClellan was given significantly less, especially in terms of manpower relative to his opponent. In addition, McClellan inflicted about as many casualties on the Army of Northern Virginia on the Peninsula as Grant did in the Overland, to within a few thousand, but McClellan took about 25,000 casualties to the AoP to achieve that and Grant took about 55,000.

Fantastic presentation, as usual. I always learn something new from your videos. What you do in presenting the Civil War battles, gives me an overview in a way that I never have met anywhere else. You give the big picture and then zoom in, as many things are hidden in the details. Then zooming out so I can see how everything are connected in a line of events, giving good and balanced judgment on what that happened. It is pure beauty!

Some times I wonder what would have happened if mclellan and grant faced lee and sydney at the same time

I actually think the best strategist against Lee is Hooker. He is just not a good field commander. Let hooker move the troops, and let someone tough like grant to handle the fight, the outcome will be much better

I was very cautious and never followed Abraham’s orders, because I know what I was doing! More smarter than “Unconditional Surrender” Grant just throwing his men like there a sack of potatoes!

McClellan's cavalry was chasing Jeb Stewart's cavalry all over the place. That is what fatigued them. Lincoln was wrong.

McClellan was an engineer who had observed the siege tactics at Sevastopol during the Crimean War. He well understood the wastage of sending infantry against fortified lines. Since he was only going to have half of the 200,000 he estimated would be required to conduct a succesful attack on Richmond, McClellan chose to rely on engineering and his artillery siege train since those were the areas where the Union had a significant advantage over the Confederates whose infantry and cavalry were their strength. The engineering would prevent needless loss of life and the artullery would pound the Confederates out of their positions. Given the high casualties at Shiloh, the Lincoln adminstration wanted to see the eastern army do some fighting. The siege at Yorktown was no slower than Halleck's advance on Corinth but McClellan was the one being pressured into a frontal assault that he resisted. Enetually McClellan got to the gates of Richmond but unfortunately the Confederates did not wait for McClellan to get his big guns into position and Lincoln blundered by witholding McDowell's 30,000 men to protect DC from Jackson's 5,000. McClellan ordered his change of base to the James and then left it to his corps cmmanders to fight the rearguard battles on their own hook. McClellan was notoriously absent from the fields his army fought on during the Seven Days. At Antitetam, McCllelan's plan was not to strike at both ends of Lee's line simultaneously. Burnside did not receive his orders until 10am when McClellan wanted an attack to prevent Lee from shifting reserves from his right. Hooker had launched his attack hours before that. McClellan not only had Franklin on the field, he had Porter as well, but chose not to support Burnside's advance on Sharpsburg. The next day Humprhey's Division arrived as well and McClellan chose not to renew the battle though Lee offered and he had two fresh corps. McClellan fought the battle piecemeal and Lee was able to counter the attacks by shifting his reserves to meet each thrust. Nowhere did McClellan ever create an overmatch at a single point or deliver enough pressure to keep Lee from shifting his troops to meet each threat. At the end of the day, McClellan was perhaps cautious, or maybe just the kind of general who knows how to train and march armies but just doesn't have that killer instinct to give orders that will cause men to die.

I've been on a civil war bender recently, watching a lot of stuff and I love watching your army movement videos.

I guess with McClellan, it's about how you finish not how you start.

Sending troops to McClellan is like thumping fleas across a barnyard not half of them get there
President Abraham Lincoln

Awesome🏅

He didn't have good calvary at the time.. the Souths calvary were levels ahead.. this wouldn't start to even up until around Gettysburg.

McLellan should have had Henry Hallocks job. He was a great organizer and recruiter. He had great vision but was shy in battle and not good at troop movement. And as we all know, far too cautious. But as secretary of war....he could have been tremendous.

McClellan intentionally did not support John Pope at 2nd Bull Run. In his personal letters he said that he would not support him because he wanted to see him defeated so that they would put him in command again. He stalled for a month and allowed his own army to get slaughtered for his own ego and ambitions. In other words, he was a piece of trash.

Very interesting view. I agree with most of your points that McClellan had reason to be careful around a very dangerous foe. But perhaps the ideas in "McClellan's Other Story" by W. B. Styple have to be considered : 1) a democrat (as most Union generals were) he had political reasons to oppose Lincoln 2) Loyal to the North, but sympathic to the South, he may have wanted to beat the Confederate Army but not destroy it. Just kind of convince them they couldn't win and have them go home, without the long term hostility an outright victory could (and did) result in. Grant, possibly the best US general ever, commented that McClellan was the biggest riddle of the war. Odd praise (sort of) considering his rather dim view of so many others. (Even Stonewall Jackson-----never really test against the Union's best and G. Thomas ----to slow to name only 2 fairly good officers.

I didn't lose! I merely failed to win!

Something which never gets discussed regarding McClellan as general of the army of the Potomac.... his political beliefs. This is strange, considering that a couple years after leading the army of the Potomac, he was running against Lincoln as "the Peace Candidate". I think his dislike of Lincoln. was more than just personal. McClellan was very much anti-abolitionist - he felt that abolitionists were the true cause of the Civil War-and had no problem returning runaway slaves to their "owners". He believed that if the North promised not to interfere with slavery (and maybe passed an amendment ... to protect it ??) the south would gladly lay down their arms and rejoin the rest of the country. He regarded casualties- on both sides-as a tragic loss in an unfortunate and unnecessary "disagreement" between North and South-brought about mainly by abolitionist fanatics. Generals in the Union Army who were pro-abolition hated McClellan and his ilk, and were known to regard them as out and out traitors. There is an interesting parallel here between the US (before and also during the Civil War) with France (before and during WWII). There is a widespread view that the French were simply cowards-whereas many of them actually preferred Hitler and/or fascism to Leon Blum and the "popular front" government France had up until June 1940. So rather than arguing whether McClellan was "excessively cautious" or not-perhaps the debate should be framed as whether McClellan was "excessively treasonous" or not.

If McClellan had shown the save bravery and guts similar to Patton, that removal from his position would have been orevented.

Prevented.

Always though McClellan got a bad rap. His 'caution' was a sound strategy as only the Confederates and politicians were in a hurry. The overall Union strategy never had to be fast, but Lincoln (the great ape his staff called him) wanted body count and he wanted it now. There was no reason to just sacrifice union troops in needless offensives. The south was never going to win and the professionals knew it. Most of the massive casualties of the war occurred late in the war under Grant and Sherman and were very arguably not at all necessary.

to trade Mcclellan for burnside seems so crazy imop

It's ironic that McClellan's reluctance to put his soldiers in harms way kept him from pushing forward and possibly putting an end to the bloodshed and saving hundreds of thousands more lives with the resulting years of war.

Jeffery ,his reason for not risking final attack being close to Richmond during The Peninsula Campaign has fascinated me since college.The most logical is the outnumbered reasoning which makes it seem he was cowardly,an Idea I don't accept. Could you possibly give more insight on this?I am no fan of his,and realize he is not Grant, but what possible logic would keep a relatively intelligent man from attempting to achieve what he came for.Surely he was worried about what Congress would do if it turned bad but I just can't get my mind around a retreat at this point. How much did Halleck have to do with the retreat? I personally believe your videos are only now being recognized for the tremendous quality they are. You provide information on details that have been dormant in many texts.If you can't further comment on The Peninsula Campaign,I understand you are busy,but this question and also why Lee held out past Petersburg has dogged me for years ❤ Godspeed Jeffery, excellent work!

Love the videos!! There are more ways for soldiers to die than in battle. McClellan probably lost as many to sickness and disease by holding them inactive, as the others lost in futile battles. Lincoln and Lee were right in wanting to FIGHT, so the battles would end.

McClellan built, trained and cultivated that army - but more than that he loved them. Maybe too much, maybe if he had ground them into hamburger meat like Grant the war would have been over sooner...or maybe not but if anything I find him to be a very human figure and probably misunderstood.

I've thought for a while that if there had been a modern General Staff organization, subordinated directly to the Secretary of War, and McClellan had been named Chief with broad latitude in training, organization, equipment and procurement - it may well have been a huge success in terms of military capability.

The Union would still probably have churned through several field commanders before getting to some version of Grant-Sherman-Sheridan-Meade, but there is little doubt in my mind that the Union Army would have achieved it's same eventual level of effectiveness, efficiency and professionalism maybe a year or more earlier (depending on the bureaucratic and institutional hurdles preventing such a military consolidation within 1860's America) than it did in real life.

McClellan get's a bad rap. He was also probably thinking strategically. There was no need to risk the Union Army by looking for a knockout punch in battle. Over time, the Union blockade would begin to take it's toll on Confederate warfighting capability. Unfortunately for McClellan, political considerations would not tolerate him sitting on his hands.

One of Lincolns advisors told the president that after McClellan took command for the second time. His actions were motivated by a desire to make a run at the presidency himself in the coming election. Sounds possible to me.

I think McClellan was guilty of treason. Stalling, failure to pursue the enemy. McClellan wanted the presidency and he thought his prolonging the war would be to his benefit in an already war weary north. His platform was to let the south go and split the union with no concern for any slaves.

In hindsight, McClellan is the kind of general the CSA needed, a man who could professionalise and reorganise its forces with good logistics and medical care, and who is cautious enough to not throw their troops carelessly with high risk tactics. Perfect for the southern strategy to merely survive against the Federal onslaught. Meanwhile, Lee, like Grant, is the kind of general the US needed at the start, a man aggressive enough to destroy rebel forces and knows how to take advantage of the strengths of the Union while not being too careless like Pope or Burnside.

With all that said, I'm in the opinion that McClellan is not incompetent at all, but merely cautious due to his experience while posted as a US army observer for the Crimean War.

Good point but I would say that did not is vastly different from "could not". McClellan could not just "win the war" for Lincoln and the Union, which would require his making the Confederacy look weak and the Union look strong. He may simply have been content with having a war. A war of attrition would have done the job for him, ultimately it did do the job for Grant, its just that Lincoln grew impatient not just with McClellans results but also with his excuses. And the truth is that most of the Rebel army travelled on foot. McClellan should have at least used better excuses. Grant apparently didnt use excuses as he had the results. But in either case neither Grant nor Lee wanted the slaughter that Grant pushed Lee into but that just meant that both sides were now committed to victory, not to efficiency.

When McClellan falters instead of driving home a killing thrust he looks like a leader who will only drive home that thrust when he can do so with minimal bloodshed and destruction of his own forces. The Rebs were too good for McClellan to defeat behind Teb lines, and so McClelan could not wiin a war of attrition unless and until he had an opportunity to fight a defensive war, which required defensive positions. He might have won at Gettysburg. But he never would have won the Western war or the March on Atlanta. And that ultimately is what brought Lee down. Without that the Rebs would not have attacked Gettysburg and might have actually attacked and taken Harrisburg instead of attacking and losing Gettysburg so even Gettysburg becomes a moot point. And if that is the case then the AofP develops supply issues not the Confederate Army. Lee becomes Grant without actually burning Union territory and certainly Md and Pa certainly WV and Ohio are at risk to switching to the Confederate side. DC then becomes isolated from the Union and the AofP risks losing men and material to the Rebs.

So we cant really worry about Gettysburg as an opportunity for McClellan to shine. He needed to have success taking Confederate strongholds to even have a chance of defending Union territory. His detractors would always say that he only won from positions of strength. In Rebel territory he would never have that advantage. He beeded to show that like Lee he could win from an underdog position.

Not likely for a man who feared being the underdog. That was not Grant. At all.
So it seemed that Lincoln just wisely realized that McClellan just did not have the characteristics that the Union needed to beat Lee. McClellan might be good at defense where he had to commit his forces and they were likely to be superior to Lees's forces, which suited McClellan well. But he had no nose for offense. Especially not in enemy territory. Even worse his subordinates also likely shared his defense-first nature that allowed Lee to snatch victory from the jaws of defeat at Antietam and Richmond.

Basically making lame excuses for losing from in front and never winning from behind is not a good career basis for holding senior officer status in a war.

Should have been an office general like halleck

Enjoy your videos Jeff .

I think it's the best video about McClellan I've ever seen. I like everything about it. Many things (especially Antietam) start making much more sense.